

The Spanish Revolt: defying the crisis from below

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Crisis and social break up: the emergence of the 15M

If we want to understand the 15M movement, we have to contextualize the social and political conditions of its emergence, that is to say, the roots of Spain's economic and democratic crisis. The crisis is intimately related with the effects of the Spanish real state bubble (1997/2007), whose catalyst was the subprime mortgage panic of 2007 in the USA. But to deal with this critical moment adequately, we have to make a brief scheme of some political and economic features of Spain's productive structure:

1. Since the fifties, under *Franco's dictatorship* rule, the country's main productive activities were focused into two areas: *real estate and tourism*. The industrial modernization made between the decades of the military dictatorship and the first years of democracy was partial and irregular, with the concentration of factories and industries in specific regions (Vasque country, Catalonia, Cantabria, Madrid) and a strong productive and social polarization¹.
2. The cost of Spain's entry in EU in 1986 was the destruction of part of its weak industrial structure. The PSOE –the party in the government– had not an alternative model of production to implement, so they accepted the partial dismantlement of Spain's industry in exchange of large economic subsidies by the EU (1 per 100 of the Spanish PIB between 1986 and 2004). The money acquired was re-invested in the same old economic sectors: real state and tourism.
3. With the *Maastricht Treaty* in 1992 Spain started its way into the neo liberal economic *dogma*. After a first Spanish cycle of growth, exhausted by the 92 real state bubble, the country reentered a new economic cycle of expansion in 1997 due to the influence of the EU: 1) The EU politics of *deficit control* (containment of public expenditure²) and the *interest of the major European financial companies* in the Spanish *real estate investment* (and other assets), the credit flowed with easiness. 2) The EURO: the European Union strengthened Spain's economy with the guarantee of their common currency, that is to say, it enhanced the power of Spain to buy and invest with more security³.

¹ We have to say –with Vicenç Navarro– that the “welfare model” of Spain has strong sub-development in comparison with the EU inversion rate in Welfare (Healthcare, Social Services, Social Housing, etc.). This sub-development, an inheritance of the military dictatorship, changed temporarily in the eighties, but it was seriously reduced during 1993 -2002 due to the politics of deficit control implemented by Maastricht. In 2002 the difference between the public spending in Spain was of 19'7% PIB, 7'2 less than in the the EU-15 during those years (26'9% PIB). This “Social Deficit” is an essential factor in today's crisis (it amplifies the effects of the cuts). Vicenç Navarro, *El subdesarrollo social de España*. (Madrid: Diario Público, 2009).P. 41-45.

²*Treaty of Maastricht*, Title VI, Chapter 1, Article 104 C. It is available in the official site of the EU: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm

³For a deep and detailed understanding of the Spanish “economic model”, see: I. Gómez, E. Rodríguez, *The Spanish Model*. (U.K.: New Left Review, N° 69). P. 5-28.

4. After a new wave of market liberalizations in Spain, implemented by the EU and IMF, the country –ruled by the PP– re-activated the real estate investment market between the years 1997-2007. During these years the housing prices increased its value in 220% and seven million houses were built⁴. The easiness of credit flow, the expansion of Spain's economy and the abnormal elevation of real estate prices, created a sort of “wealth effect” in the middle of these “golden years”. But in 2007, due to the subprime crisis, the bubble burst.

The general failure of Spain's financial and banking structure was obscured and almost negated during the first months of the panic, and the reaction of the PSOE was slow and inefficient. The government started to implement an economic policy to “save the banks” instead the economy of the indebted households. The sovereign debt ratio began its irreversible rise, and in 2008 the austerity economic measures arrived: cuts in social services, racist migration laws, quick and massive evictions to guarantee bank real estate assets, labor reforms with the aim of deregulate the labor force market, give more power to the employers and destroy the rights of the workers, etc.

The social and economic pressures generated by these measures provoked the great demonstration of the 15 of May of 2011. From its beginning, the 15M denounced all the responsible actors of the crisis: the banks, the government, the traditional parties and trade unions. The basis of the Spanish liberal democracy – the so-called democratic regime of 1978⁵– was also questioned by the movement. The 17 of May, after a Facebook and Twitter collective call, the Sun square went occupied by a multitude. The concentration acquired the form of a *general assembly*, and quickly divided itself into different *assemblies*, *commissions* and *work groups*, organized in democratic and horizontal ways. The result of this organization was *Acampada Sol* (Sun encampment), a collective occupation of the center of the city that lasted for one month. After this, the encampment disappeared from the center of Madrid, transforming itself into a *web of interconnected assemblies* disseminated throughout the Spanish geography: *local assemblies* in the municipalities (rural or semi-rural environments), *district assemblies* in the cities (urban environments).

2.15M - The Indignados revolt: dynamics of a non-institutional antagonism

We can talk about the 15-M as a *leftist non-institutional social movement*, organized in terms of *horizontal and participatory –direct– democracy* (de-centralized assemblies). The movement has opened a new wave or cycle of social struggles in Spain against austerity, generating –at the same time– a profound innovation in the articulation of antagonism. Let us summarize briefly the innovations of the movement: 1) Autonomous production of *critical knowledge* and *information* by multiple agents; 2) The common use of the Internet, Facebook, Twitter and the Blogosphere as a tool for organization (we will deal with this important issue in the third section); 3) The defense of *the right to the city*⁶: defense of public transport, public spaces, public services for all (healthcare, education, social services); 4) A radical critique of political representation, liberal democracy and capitalism with the aim to transcend the classic forms of public/private institutions (State, parties, trade-unions); 5) The *common production* of a *new protest culture*, with a singular vocabulary and new political grammar (new repertoires of protest/organization; we will deal with

⁴Ibid.P. 5.

⁵In 1977, with the first democratic elections after the death of Franco, starts the period in Spain called “the transition”; during this period the constitution of 78 was written, the monarchy was restored and a silence pact between the political forces was made, forgetting the victims of dictatorship. This pacts are the roots of bipartidism (between the Popular Party or PP, and the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party or PSOE), the silencing of historical memory and gave birth to the institutional system of Spain.

⁶ For instance, the right to a democratic/popular control of the urban space as public or common, the citizen's government of the city resources (Social Services, distribution of rent) and the collective construction of a non-segregated distribution of the space (anti-gentrification). See: David Harvey, *The Right to the city*. (UK: New Left Review, N° 53, 2008). P. 23 - 40.

this in the fourth section)⁷.

Going beyond this summary, it's essential to point two central elements of the movement: its *composition*, *articulation* and its *inclusive logic*. These three features have given birth to *new social agents*.

a) *Composition*: the 15M it's an *intergenerational* and *interclassist* movement. We can find people from different generations working in the collective protests or projects. This interesting feature has been fundamental in the construction of *militant historical memory*: from the anti-fascist opposition to Franco's dictatorship and the first steps of Spanish democracy, to the radical criticism of neoliberalism. While the elders -and not so old- have supported the 15M with their knowledge and militant know-how, the young people have constructed an infrastructure of communications and new antagonisms difficult to imagine years ago. The 15M is also an interclassist movement. One of the main militant networks of the movement belongs to the "precariat" (young people with high or medium education, without employment or victim of the precariousness) but inside the movement there are many different strata of the traditional working class (medium classes, working classes). Though there are barely workers from agriculture or industry, the 15M is full of workers of the services sector (this sector produces the 71'3 % of the Spanish PIB).

b) *Articulation*: The horizontal articulation of the movement and its radical critic to "political representation" prevent us to frame it with classic terms like "homogeneous class consciousness" or "vanguard": these two concepts are in need of a third, "the political party" and the classical mediation of "political representation". We have to change the classical perspectives to enter the proposals of the *indignados*. Opposite to a homogeneous and/or hierarchical "class consciousness" we can talk about "common production of class/political consciousness", instead of "vanguard" we have to think in terms of "plural and horizontal leadership" and instead of party we have to put "Assembly". The concept that substitutes "representation" is "participation". Although this is a schematic presentation, it is a good point of departure to understand the internal structure of the movement in global terms.

c) *Inclusive logic*: due to the inclusive logic of the 15M, the movement has become a kind of catalyst of social conflict, a force that has the power to link together many antagonisms and movements of social discontent (Feminists, LGTB groups, Migrant associations, leftist minor parties, precariat, okupas, young students, etc.). This open political grammar has affected the discourse of sectorial protests and has also contributed to the creation of *new political agents* like the *Mareas (Tides)*: a hybridization of public workers of different sectors, the 15M, trade unions and citizens that fight in defense of public rights and services. The organizational dynamics of the Tides are very similar to the 15M, the main difference is that they are focused in specific problems (for example: Green Tide – Education, White Tide – Healthcare, Violet – Women rights, and so on). This new social agents have shown great force in the streets, and thanks to their pressure the public services have been defended of many attacks (privatizations/externalizations).

The role of Social networks: dialectics between physical and virtual dimensions in the 15-M

Regarding the important issue of social networking, we will try a dialectical approach to the phenomenon. In other words, an approach that maintains the tension between the "positive" and "negative" aspects of the virtual innovations (we'll try to dodge the "fetishist" tendency and the "denier" tendency – which is blind to the changes introduced by the virtual space).

⁷ For a global analysis of the 15M dynamics, see: Mario Espinoza Pino, *Politics of Indignation: Radical Democracy and Class Struggle beyond Postmodernity*. (UK: Rethinking Marxism, April 2013).

The matter of the *representation of repression* has been a key element to spread mobilization. The eviction of Sol Square on May 17 2011⁸, the eviction of Catalonia's Square⁹ and the *tomaelcongreso* demonstration of September 25th 2012¹⁰ are three interesting examples. They are also examples on the way social media has been the principal tool in disseminating such representation (videos in Youtube from cameras inside the crowd, going through the same experience as the protesters, sharing with them insecurity feelings). We will quote just three data: between April and May 2011 the use of Internet in Spain increased by 20% (and the network N-1 – created by the 15-M- increased from 3,000 to 40,000 users). Other key fact is that 94% of those who attended the protest on 15M had a social networking profile. Finally, when the movement was on its peak, an 82% of the Spanish population got information about 15M through social networks, a great percent compared to the 33% who used television and the 23% who used the press¹¹. It is obvious, then, that the Internet has played a key role¹². The information created on Internet is decentralized, flows with interpretative comments of multiple sources, comes from different social sectors, and challenges the one-way procedure of the classical mass media (connected to economic and political power groups¹³).

These images about the revolt and repression were not only emitted by the *media oligopoly*, but also by the traditional Spanish media; this two sources distorted the videos and images in order to discredit or criminalize the protest. Looking over some of the struggles in this cycle of movements (in Slovenia, Turkey and Spain at least) we can conclude that this sequence is common: uprisings, criminalization, and creation of massive networks of information outside of the classical mass media¹⁴.

Despite the lack of economic resources, the movement has been able to generate at full speed its own channels and methods of expression to legitimize their own social struggles. From their own websites (as "tomalaplaza.net"), radio ("Agora Sol Radio") to the alternative press (existent press which has seen its number of readers¹⁵ exponentially increased or directly press created as a result of the mobilizations¹⁶).

We can certainly affirm that the Network has built up the structure of the organization since the very first days of the 15M. Although it remained essential, it has been in a hybrid way, because the place where people took decisions was on the street, in the assemblies, occupying public spaces (the network speeded and complemented the physical work). *The movement has given a radical importance to the physical presence in the public space. The task of redefinition of the public space has become central.* This centrality counteracts a number of dangers which go together with the use of new technologies in a *postmodern context*¹⁷. We will quote some of them:

⁸http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Vm48Eeb_Y

⁹<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-ywduaV3bk>

¹⁰<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5V5i4CPxI>

¹¹http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/07/30/opinion/1375192019_870036.html

¹² One sight about the intensity of the messages in Twitter: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5w4amBIHj4>. It is very easy to take the similarities with the Gezi Park movement: the number of active Twitter users in Turkey rose from 1.8 million on May 29th to 9.5 million on June 10th.

¹³ About the relations between this huge technological change and its effects on the political - social area, there is a recent research organized by J. Toret, a disciple of Manuel Castells: *Tecnopolítica y 15M. La potencia de las multitudes conectadas* (It can be found here, included in English <http://datanalysis15m.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/lanzamiento-tecnopolitica-y-15m-la-potencia-de-las-multitudes-conectadas-el-sistema-red-15m-un-nuevo-paradigma-de-la-politica-distribuida/>)

¹⁴ The mass media in Spain is a *mediatic oligopoly with a monopolistic tendency*. Only three groups - PRISA, Planeta and Mediaset - possess the principal channels of television and radio.

¹⁵ *Madrilonia, Diagonal, Periodismohumano, Publico, El Diario.es.*

¹⁶ *15M news, La Marea, TintaLibre* - on paper – or, after the mass dismissal of *El País*, the page "infolibre"

¹⁷ About the topic of the surprising success of the social networks, the work of F. Jameson's *El posmodernismo o la lógica cultural*

- a) The insistence on the need to occupy public space *bodily* is a blow against *the virtual fetishism* of the "networks revolutionary." We can define this type of "fetishism" as the expression of discomfort and critical opinion only by virtual means, taking these means as "the real" space of protests. (This limited attitude can be seen as an expression of neoliberal individual, "free" of all social ties. He feels himself "free" when he can express himself or consume intense experiences infinitely (the networks!) but its real power –material power– is amputee).
- b) The *new utopianism* that understands new technologies, by themselves, as "the way" of liberation.
- c) The *impossible rhythm of the networks*. The time of the social movements is more related with "the time of the bodies" because, as Guillermo Zapata¹⁸ has noted, networks "never close" (stream communication), they have a "digital time" that is constantly running, and it's impossible for our bodies to operate in a "digital rhythm".

Finally we would like to discuss the concept of "informative guerrilla" which has been proposed by Umberto Eco¹⁹. According to this semiologist, the answer to the increasing concentration of the media is not to conquest "the winter palace" of the Media; we have to develop a decentralized guerrilla war, which conquers the receiver and not just the message channel. But we could say that no one guarantees us the old battlefield will lose its importance because we want it. This means: if we forget a statewide Project of communication, democratized and under popular control, maybe we are relying too much on the spontaneity of a "consciousness change".

Struggle Innovations: new methods and strategies of dissent

The acts of civil disobedience have become "massive" thanks to the popularity gained by the movement. The collective protests placed on the "public agenda" the problem of political legitimacy, not only of the protests themselves but also about the legitimacy of the institutions questioned: when more than 30,000 people defy the order of the government to vacate Sol square, they cannot be easily criminalized. The massive response can be considered a great victory for the movement. We shall list a number of ways of social struggle that have been practiced, especially emphasizing those we consider most relevant: 1) the "*escraches*"²⁰: organized by the *Platform of People Affected by the Mortgage* (Spanish initials *PAH*) as a popular form of complaint against persons accused of human rights violations or corruption, which is done by acts such as sitting, protesting or making paintings outside their private home or public places; 2) "*15M pa Rato*"²¹ *online Crowdfunding*: in less than 24h, the movement got 16,000 euros by means of goteo.org, a new crowdfunding site; 3) the "*citizens referendums*" organized by the different *Tides*; 4) "*Yo no pago*", this initiative consisted in not paying the subway ticket in order to denounce the rise of the prices in the public transports; 5) *Stopping of racist raids and evictions*²²; 6) "*Tomalahuelga*": a platform created by different collectives trying to involve all the different sectors which form our

del capitalismo avanzado (Barcelona: Paidós, 1991)

¹⁸ Guillermo Zapata, "Los nuevos panfletos, las nuevas plazas. Redes Sociales y movimiento 15-M" in *¡Ocupemos el mundo!* (Barcelona: Icaria, 2012)

¹⁹ Umberto Eco, "Para una guerrilla semiológica", in *La estrategia de una ilusión* (Barcelona: Lumen, 1986)

²⁰ This is just one example of lot of them: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJKkRjL1fzE>. About the history of this method of struggle: <http://www.rebellion.org/noticia.php?id=167602>

²¹ <http://15mparato.wordpress.com/>

²² These practices inspired the same actions in Germany, where however the main problem with the housing law is the rise of the rent (not the mortgages).

complex society to the strike; 7) The growth of the *Okupa's movement*²³; 8) The emblematic *occupations of the public space* (with great symbolic power and, at the same time, defying the neoliberal logics of atomization due to the collective occupation).

We will finish this section with some remarks. Clearly, the 15M has been a hurricane of fresh air on the Left, and without it, it wouldn't be possible to understand neither the form nor the content of the mobilizations of the last years. But we could set some matters in question. In the first place, we can ask if these kinds of decentralized organization, without hierarchy or leadership, in which information flows in all directions thanks to new technologies, etc. are suitable for the whole civil society, or only to certain sectors. Seeing the rest of uprisings of this cycle, it is clear that the most of them have a "generational mark" (between 20-40 years old). How many people do not have access to a hyperactive life on the net? What happens with the old people or people without technological knowledge? And what happens with migrant people? A second question: how many people can afford to discuss almost daily at an assembly for several hours? Is the excessive emphasis on direct democracy without delegation or representation a cause of the exclusion of some sectors of the population that could be mobilized?²⁴ How can we evaluate and face the lack of confidence in the existing political organizations (included the leftist political parties)? What are the limits of a movement which, in part, considers suspicious the existing institutions *qua* institutions?²⁵

Conclusions and commonalities: Europe in question, Europe as conflict

During the *Teaching the crisis* meeting we found many commonalities between the Spanish situation and the social conjunctures presented by the other working groups: it is clear that we are not only in *the same* cycle of economic and social crisis, but in an interesting moment for constructing political alternatives across Europe. Beyond this general diagnosis, there is an obvious *unequal development of the crisis* and the social antagonisms against the politics of austerity. We can sketch this unequal development in terms of *center-periphery* relations, that is to say, between the *strong capitalist economies of the north* and the precarious and *indebted economies of the south*.

1) The "Center" countries: we've seen common patterns between Switzerland, Germany, Finland and also Austria in the way they "represent" the narrative of the crisis. The crisis has nothing to do with "internal causes" or inherent problems of the economic structure of the "center" countries (or the EU), the strategy is to create a foreign enemy (the southern people) constructed through cultural stereotypes (for instance, the image of the "lazy" Spanish, the "lazy" Greek). This cultural image allows the governments to throw the problem outside its territory; they create a "scapegoat" to justify their actions (cuts, compression of rent, de-regulation of workers' rights, etc.) through a "postmodern national unity". This new type of nationalism represents the capitalist crisis as a "national identity crisis", sublimating the material contradictions and the political responsibilities into a question of "culture affirmation". The problem is not "us" but "them": the "other", racialized, stigmatized and localized (in the south) as a source of social and economic instability. This separation between "Us – the other" re-creates latent dualities that have always coexisted in Europe, understanding them as oppositions: developed – undeveloped, civilized – non

²³ In Madrid there were around ten "occupied social centers" in 2011, and in just a few months they became eighteen. What is interesting to emphasize is that this practice of struggle has been, little by little, legitimized by the Spanish society (we have to remember the Real Estate Bubble). These centers are producing new ways of organizing the community (even sometimes providing social services which the municipality government had cut). They are as well as spearhead in the fight against gentrification.

²⁴ Although the emphasis on direct democracy is a healthy response to the emptying of liberal institutions, we believe that democracy should not be confused with its procedure. We would say we should tend to a conception of democracy in the sense that reminded us, in Spain, A. Domènech: not only the government of the poor (etymological sense) but as the struggle and empowerment of several popular sectors (the "demos") against the privileged sectors of the social body. Antoni Domènech, *El eclipse de la fraternidad* (Madrid: Crítica, 2004)

²⁵ About this topic, the last chapter of David Harvey's *Breve historia del neoliberalismo* (Madrid: Akal, 2007).

civilized, industrious – lazy, white – black/southern, etc. This sort of colonial dualism has implemented in certain countries, for example Switzerland or Austria, a strong institutional racism (a shared feature, as we'll see, with some southern countries). Obviously, as we've said above, this polarization is rooted in the different position of the countries inside the capitalist hegemony in Europe. Neoliberalism “resurrects” racism, authoritarianism and segregation by class –due the destruction of rights– as tools of repression and individualization of the collective conflicts.

2) The “Periphery” countries: it is interesting to point out that Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain have many features in common: they are the European frontier with the north of Africa, they have sub-developed (though in different degree) Welfare models and most of them (the exception here is Italy) share a “recent past” with dictatorial governments (with similar periods of transition to democracy: Spain, “La transición”, Greece, “Metapolitefsi”, Portugal, “Processo Revolucionário em Curso”; this “transitions” are denounced nowadays as insufficient democratic processes²⁶). The debt-crisis seems to have many commonalities between the Mediterranean countries in terms of history, culture and economy, but we can't underestimate the similarities of these countries with Turkey or Slovenia (and even Albania). For instance, social movements as the *15M* (Spain), *15O* (Slovenia), *Taksim Square/Gezi Park* (Turkey) and *Que se lixe a Troika* (Portugal), represent a counter-attack against this cycle of crisis, the reactivation of the socio-political antagonism. In the same way that we have talked about an *unequal development of the crisis*, we can talk about an *unequal empowerment of the social movements* in the cartography of the crisis (including north and south). First of all, the movements are more developed in the countries of the south, and they share common patterns in their critiques of democracy and capitalism: a) critiques towards liberal democracy (with different degrees of radicalism) b) Opposition to the traditional party system (which includes *autonomous organization* against the “State-form” and/or a partial reactivation of the *civil associativism*: associations, new radical parties) c) The construction of a culture of protest which includes new social agents and, at the same time, a great amount of people without previous militant experience (youth) d) Anti-capitalism (or, at least, a radical social-democratic approach). Though it is clear that the political context of Turkey, with a charismatic governor (Erdogan) and a strong religious ideology, is different from the context of Greece, where there is a radical questioning of the legitimacy of the governors (ND, Pasok, DIMAR) in *electoral* terms and the protest is very active (the rise of Syriza, the struggles on the streets), the “administration of the crisis” tries to achieve similar aims in the south: 1) *To apply neoliberal measures* in the Welfare State (Cuts, Privatization of the public services) 2) *Deregulation of the Labor Market* (Destruction of labor rights, Precarization of work, Ideology of entrepreneurship) 3) *Authoritarianism of the governments* (Fascist Penal Reforms, Penal State (Wacquant), Rising of police action, Destruction of the rights of protest and freedom expression, Institutional Racism²⁷) 4) *The payment of the odious debt at all costs* (especially in Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy).

3) The “15M” in the conjuncture: the *15M* shares many features with the *15O*, *Que se lixe a troika* and *Gezi Park/Taksim Square*. The Spanish *Indignados* movement lasts for almost three years, and during this time we have seen many changes in the composition of the movement and in its objectives. Though the political of the first days maintains its force, the tendencies/ideologies inside the movement have created different tools to implement the general objectives of the 15M. On the one hand, the leftist social-democrats involved in the 15M are now militants of *IU* (Left United) and *IA* (Anti-capitalist Left, more radical) or, on the other hand, many activists have created their own “parties” like *AdA* (Alternatives From Below), *EnRed* or the *X Party*. The idea of many activists is to create an “assembly” (open-horizontal) inside a party, using it as a *tool* but not as the definitive answer of their demands. But there are also people who don't want to participate in the

²⁶ An interesting analysis of the historical conjuncture of these periods can be found in: Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the dictatorships: Portugal, Spain, Greece* (London: NLB/Humanities Press, 1976).

²⁷ The rise of nazi movements as “Golden Dawn” in Greece and the “migration question” (in relation with the crisis) create new social pressures and inequalities for the migrants, translated in their exclusion from basic social services and their social stigmatization/marginalization.

electoral logic (though they see these "party-projects" as positive) and try to implement a *hybridization* of the institutions with the movement through social pressure (something risky but sometimes effective). Schematically, we can say there is a tendency –more electoral– that assumes “taking the power” as their main objective, and there is other (non-focused on electioneering, but not anti-electoral) that thinks in the creation of a *new institutionalization*. What seems obvious, we think, is that these two tendencies will be “condemned to understanding”, because the transformation of society requires the construction of *hegemony*; that is to say, not only the destitutional process that delegitimizes the government, capitalism and the State as we know it, but a constituent process that is in need of new powers (electoral transformations) and counter-powers (new institutions, radical democracy). But can we introduce the logic of the movement into the institutions? Can we transform the economic relations without constructing productive alternatives? Can we link the electoral processes with new candidatures and social antagonisms? The 15M has many questions to resolve (the *commons*, *participatory democracy*) and many challenges to overcome (abandon liberal, traditional bureaucratic tendencies, courage to construct new forms of organization and candidatures), but we are on the road.